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Abstract
The detection of online cyberbullying has seen an increase in societal importance,
popularity in research, and available open data. Nevertheless, while computational
power and affordability of resources continue to increase, the access restrictions on
high-quality data limit the applicability of state-of-the-art techniques. Consequently,
much of the recent research uses small, heterogeneous datasets, without a thorough
evaluation of applicability. In this paper, we further illustrate these issues, as we (i)
evaluate many publicly available resources for this task and demonstrate difficulties
with data collection. These predominantly yield small datasets that fail to capture the
required complex social dynamics and impede direct comparison of progress. We (ii)
conduct an extensive set of experiments that indicate a general lack of cross-domain
generalization of classifiers trained on these sources, and openly provide this frame-
work to replicate and extend our evaluation criteria. Finally, we (iii) present an ef-
fective crowdsourcing method: simulating real-life bullying scenarios in a lab setting
generates plausible data that can be effectively used to enrich real data. This largely
circumvents the restrictions on data that can be collected, and increases classifier per-
formance. We believe these contributions can aid in improving the empirical practices
of future research in the field.
1 Introduction
Learning to accurately classify rare phenomena within large feeds of data poses challenges
for numerous applications of machine learning. The volume of data required for repre-
sentative instances to be included is often resource-consuming, and limited access to such
instances can severely impact the reliability of predictions. These limitations are particu-
larly prevalent in applications dealing with sensitive social phenomena such as those found
in the field of forensics: e.g., predicting acts of terrorism, detecting fraud, or uncovering
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sexually transgressive behavior. Their events are complex and require rich representations
for effective detection. Conversely, online text, images, and meta-data capturing such inter-
actions have commercial value for the platforms they are hosted on and are often off-limits
to protect users’ privacy.
An application affected by such limitations with increasing societal importance and
growing interest over the last decade is that of cyberbullying detection. Not only is it sen-
sitive, but the data is also inherently scarce in terms of public access. Most cyberbullying
events are off-limits to the majority of researches, as they take place in private conversa-
tions. Fully capturing the social dynamics and complexity of these events requires much
richer data than available to the research community up until now. Related to this, various
issues with the operationalization of cyberbullying detection research were recently demon-
strated by [50], who share much of the same concerns as we will discuss in this work. While
their work focuses on methodological rigor in prior research, we will focus on the core lim-
itations of the domain and complexity of cyberbullying detection. Through an evaluation
of the current advances on the task, we illustrate how the mentioned issues affect current
research, particularly cross-domain. Finally, we demonstrate crowdsourcing in an experi-
mental setting to potentially alleviate the task’s data scarcity. First, however, we introduce
the theoretical framing of cyberbullying and the task of automatically detecting such events.
1.1 Cyberbullying
Asynchrony and optional anonymity are characteristic of online communication as we know
it today; it heavily relies on the ability to communicate with people who are not physi-
cally present, and stimulates interaction with people outside of one’s group of close friends
through social networks [35]. The rise of these networks brought various advantages to
adolescents: studies show positive relationships between online communication and social
connectedness [6, 62], and that self-disclosure on these networks benefits the quality of ex-
isting and newly developed relationships [57]. The popularity of social networks and instant
messaging among children has resulted in this age group using devices that are connected
to the Internet from increasingly younger ages [42], with 95% of teens1 ages 12–17 on-
line, of which 80% are on social media [33]. For them, however, the transition from social
interaction predominantly taking place on the playground to being mediated through mo-
bile devices [34] has also moved negative communication to a platform where indirect and
anonymous interaction has a window into homes.
A range of studies conducted by the Pew Research Center2, most notably [33], provides
detailed insight into these developments. While 78% of teens report positive outcomes from
their social media interactions, 41% have experienced at least some adverse outcomes, rang-
ing from arguments, trouble with school and parents, physical fights and ending friendships.
From 19% bullied in the 12 months prior to the study, 8% of all teens reported this was some
form of cyberbullying. These numbers are comparable to other research [39, 28] (7% for
grades 6–12, and 15% grades 9–12 respectively). Bullying has for a while been regarded as
a public health risk by numerous authorities [67], with depression, anxiety, low self-esteem,
school absence, lower grades, and risk of self-medication as primary concerns.
1Survey conducted in 2011 among 799 American teens. Black and Latino families were oversampled.
2www.pewinternet.org
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The act of cyberbullying—other than being conducted online—shares the characteris-
tics of traditional bullying: a power imbalance between the bully and victim [54], the harm
is intentional, repeated over time, and has a negative psychological effect on the victim [18].
With the Internet as a communication platform however, some additional aspects arise: lo-
cation, time, and physical presence have become an irrelevant factor in the act. Accordingly,
several categories unique to this form of bullying are defined [66, 5]: flaming (sending rude
or vulgar messages), outing (posting private information or manipulated personal material
of an individual without consent), harassment (repeatedly sending offensive messages to a
single person), exclusion (from an online group), cyberstalking (terrorizing through sending
explicitly threatening and intimidating messages), denigration (spreading online gossips),
and impersonation. Moreover, in addition to optional anonymity hiding the critical figures
behind an act of cyberbullying, it could also obfuscate the number of actors (i.e., there
might only be one even though it seems there are more). Cyberbullying acts can prove
challenging to remove once published; messages or images might persist through sharing
and be viewable by many (as is typical for hate pages), or available to a few (in group or
direct conversations). Hence, it can be argued that any form of harassment has become
more accessible and intrusive. This online nature has an advantage as well: in theory, plat-
forms record these bullying instances. Therefore, an increasing number of researches are
interested in the automatic detection (and prevention) of cyberbullying.
1.2 Detection and Task Complexity
The task of cyberbullying detection can be broadly defined as the use of machine learning
techniques to automatically classify text in messages on bullying content, or infer charac-
teristic features based on higher-order information, such as user features or social network
attributes. Bullying is most apparent in younger age groups through direct verbal outings
[61], and more subtle in older groups, mainly manifested in more complex social dynamics
such as exclusion, sabotage, and gossip [45]. Therefore, the majority of work on the topic
focuses on younger age groups, be it deliberately or given that the primary source for data
is social media—which will likely result in these being highly present for some media [21].
Apart from the well-established challenges that language-use poses (e.g., ambiguity, sar-
casm), two factors in the event add further linguistic complexity, namely that of actor role
and associated context. In contrast to tasks where adequate information is provided in the
text of a single message alone, to completely map a cyberbullying event and pinpoint bully
and victim implies some understanding of the dynamics between the involved actors and
the concurrent textual interpretation.
Roles Firstly, there is a commonly made distinction between several actors within a cyber-
bullying event. A naive role allocation includes a bully B, a victim V and bystander BY , the
latter of whommay or may not approve of the act of bullying. More nuanced models such as
that of [67] include the additional roles of reinforcer BF, assistant AB, defender S, reporter
R, and accuser A. Different roles can be assigned to one person; for example, being bullied
and reporting this—they are visualized in Figure 1. Most importantly, all shown roles can
be present in the span of one single thread on social media, as demonstrated in Table 1.
While some roles clearly show from frequent interaction with either a positive or negative
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Figure 1: Role graph of a bullying event. Each vertex represents an actor, labeled by their
role in the event. Each edge indicates a stream of communication, labeled by whether this
is positive (+) or negative (−) in nature, and its strength the frequency of interaction. The
dotted vertices were added by [67] to account for social-media-specific roles.
Table 1: Fictional example of a cyberbullying conversation. Lines represent sequential
turns. Roles are noted as described on Page 3 (under the eponymous paragraph), if the
message can be considered bullying byD, and types according to [64].
Line Role Message Bully Type
1 V me and my friends hanging out tonight! :) neutral
2 B @V lol b*tch, you dont have any friends.. ur fake as sh*t D curse, insult
3 AB @B haha word, shes so sad D encouragement
4 VF @V you know it girl
5 S @V dont listen to @B, were gonna have fun for sure! defense
6 V @B shut up @B!! nobody asked your opinion!!!! defense
7 A @B you are a f*cking bully, go outside or smt insult
8 B @V @S haha you all so dumb, just kill yourself already! D insult, curse
9 A, R @B shut up or ill report you
10 B @A u gonna cry? go ahead, see what happens tomorrow! D threat
sentiment (B, V , A), others might not be observable through any form of conversation (R,
BY ), are too subtle, or not distinguishable from other roles.
Context Secondly, the content of the messages has to be interpreted differently between
these roles. While curse words can be a good indication of harassment, identification of a
bully arguably requires more than these alone. Consider Table 1: both B and A use insults
(lines 7–8), the message of V (line 6) might be considered as bullying in isolation, and hav-
ing already determined B, the last sentence (line 10) can generally be regarded as a threat.
In conclusion, the full scope of the task is complex; it could have a temporal-sequential
character, would benefit from determining actors and their interactions, and then should
have some sense of severity as well (e.g. distinguish bullying from teasing).
1.3 Our Contributions
Surprisingly, a significant amount of work on the task does not collect (or use) data that al-
lows for the inference of such features (which we will further elaborate on in Section 3). To
confirm this, we reproduce part of the previous cyberbullying detection research on differ-
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ent sources. Predictions made by current automatic methods for cyberbullying classification
are demonstrated not to reflect the above-described task complexity; we show performance
drops across different training domains, and give insights into content feature importance
and limitations. Additionally, we report on reproducibility issues in the current state-of-art
work when subjected to our evaluation. To facilitate future reproduction, we will provide all
code open-source, including dataset readers, experimental code, and qualitative analyses.3
Finally, we present a method to collect crowdsourced cyberbullying data in an experimental
setting. It grants control over the size and richness of the data, does not invade privacy, nor
rely on external parties to facilitate data access. Most importantly, we demonstrate that it
successfully increases classifier performance. With this work, we provide suggestions on
improving methodological rigor and hope to aid the community in a more realistic evalua-
tion and implementation of this task of societal importance.
2 Related Work
The task of detecting cyberbullying content can be roughly divided into three categories.
First, research with a focus on binary classification, where it is only relevant if a message
contains bullying or not. Second, more fine-grained approaches where the task is to de-
termine either the role of actors in a bullying scenario or the content type (i.e., different
categories of bullying). Both binary and fine-grained approaches predominantly focus on
text-based features. Lastly, meta-data approaches that take more than just message content
into account; these might include profile, network, or image information. Here, we will
discuss efforts relevant to the task of cyberbullying classification within these three topics.
We will predominantly focus on work conducted on openly available data, and those that
report (positive) F1-scores, to promote fair comparisons.
4 For an extensive literature review
and a detailed comparison of different studies, see [50].
2.1 Binary Classification
One of the first traceable suggestions for applying text mining specifically to the task of
cyberbullying detection is made by [30], who note that [68] previously tried to classify
online harassment on the CAW 2.0 dataset.5 In the latter research, Yin et al. already state
that the ratio of documents with harassing content to typical documents is challengingly
small. Moreover, they foresee several other critical issues with regards to the task: a lack
of positive instances will make detecting characteristic features a difficult task, and human
labeling of such a dataset might have to face issues of ambiguity and sarcasm that are hard
to assess when messages are taken out of conversation context. Even with very sparse
datasets (with less than 1% positive class instances), the harassment classifier outperforms
the random baseline using tf·idf, pronoun, curse word, and post similarity features.
3Available at https://github.com/cmry/amica .
4Unfortunately, numerous (recent) work on cyberbullying detection seems not to report such F1-scores (in
favor of accuracy), limit to criticized datasets with high baseline scores (such as the CAW datasets) or do not
show enough methodological rigor—some are therefore not included in this overview.
5Data has been made available at caw2.barcelonamedia.org.
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Table 2: Overview of datasets for cyberbullying detection. Lists the authors of the initial
sets (Author), which work was conducted on it after publishing (Other), a reference name
(Name), if it is publicly available and a link to its source (OS), which platform it was
extracted from (Platform), the amount of reported cyberbullying instances (Pos), and that
of non-cyberbullying (Neg), a reference to the work achieving the highest score on the data
(Max) and what this (positive) F1-score was (F1). Please note that the instance numbers are
as reported in the original work, and may have deviated through time (such as Twitter sets,
and Formspring).
Author Other Name OS Platform Pos Neg Max F1
[68] [40] CAW KON v Kongregate 42 4802 [40] .920
[68] [40] CAW SLS v Slashdot 60 4303 [40] .920
[68] [40] CAW MSP v Myspace 65 1946 [40] .920
[47] [31, 56, 48, 49] KON FRM v Formspring 369 3915 [49] .848
[20] [] DIN YTB x YouTube 2277 4500 [20] −
[4] [70, 56] BAY MSP v Myspace 415 1647 [70] .776
[67] [71] XU TREC v Twitter 684 1762 [71] .780
[16] [] DDV MSP x Myspace 311 8938 [16] .350
[16] [] DDV YTB x YouTube 449 4177 [16] .640
[9] [] BRT TWI v Twitter 220 5162 [9] .726
[9] [] BRT TW2 v Twitter 194 2599 [9] .719
[24] [] AMI ASK v Ask.fm 3787 86419 [24] .465
[27] [12] HOS INS v Instagram 567 1387 [12] .783
[58] [70] SUI TWI v Twitter 2102 5219 [70] .719
Following up [68], [47] note that the CAW 2.0 dataset is generally unfit for cyberbullying
classification: in addition to lacking bullying labels (it only provides harassment labels), the
conversations are predominantly between adults. Their work, along with [4], is a first effort
to create datasets for cyberbullying classification through scraping the question-answering
website Formspring.me, as well as Myspace.6 In contrast with similar research, they aim
to use textual features while deliberately avoiding Bag-of-Words (BoW) features. Through
a curse word dictionary and custom severity annotations, they construct several metrics for
features related to these “bad” words. In their more recent paper, [31] redid analyses on the
KON FRM set, primarily focusing on the contribution curse words have in the classification
of bullying messages. By forming queries from curse word dictionaries, they show that
there is no one combination which retrieves all. Moreover, using Essential Dimensions of
Latent Semantic Indexing, they show potential for extracting messages containing harmful
content, favoring high precision.
More recent efforts include [9], who combined word normalization, Named Entity
Recognition to detect person-specific references, and multiple curse word dictionaries [41,
10, 38] in a rule-based pattern classifier, scoring well on Twitter data.7 Our own work [24],
where we collected a large dataset with posts from Ask.fm, used standard BoW features as a
first test. Later, these were extended in [63] with term lists, subjectivity lexicons, and topic
6Data has been made available at www.chatcoder.com/DataDownload .
7Data has been made available at www.ub-web.de/research.
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model features. Recently popularized techniques of word embeddings and neural networks
have been applied by [71, 70] on XU TREC, NAY MSP and SUI TWI, both resulting in the
highest performance for those sets. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) on phonetic
features were applied by [69] and [49] investigate among others the same architecture on
textual features in combination with Long Short Term Memory Networks (LSTMs). Both
[49] and that of [2] investigate the C-LSTM [72], the latter includes Synthetic Minority
Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE). However, as we will show in the current research,
both of these works suffer from reproducibility issues. Finally, fuzzified vectors of top-k
word lists for each class were used to conduct membership likelihood-based classification
by [48] on KON FRM, boosting recall over previously used methods.
2.2 Fine-Grained Classification
The common denominator of the previously discussed research was a focus on detecting
single messages with evidence of cyberbullying per instance. The work of [67] proposes a
more fine-grained approach by looking at bullying traces; i.e., the responses to a bullying
incident. Their research is split up in a set of tasks on keyword-retrieved (bully) Twitter
data:8 (1) a text classification task where solely relying on uni+bigram features yielded the
best result, (2) a role labeling task, where semantic role labeling was then used to distin-
guish person-mention roles, (3) the incorporation of sentiment in the sentiment analysis task
(3) to determine teasing, where despite high accuracy, 48% of the positive instances were
misclassified. Finally, (4) a latent topic modeling task, applying Latent Dirichlet Allocation
to their corpus to note that some of the generated topics were relevant to bullying. Lastly, in
our work, we demonstrated the difficulty of fine-grained approaches with simple BoW and
sentiment features, especially detecting types of cyberbullying [24, 64].
2.3 Meta-data Features
A notable, yet less popular aspect of this task is the utilization of a graph for visualiz-
ing potential bullies and their connections. This method was first adopted by [40], who
use this information in combination with a classifier trained on LDA and weighted tf·idf
features to detect bullies and victims on the CAW * datasets. Work that more concretely
implements techniques from graph theory is that of [56], who used a wide range of fea-
tures: network features to measure popularity (e.g., degree centrality, closeness centrality),
content-based features, (length, sentiment, offensive words, second-person pronouns), and
incorporated age, gender, and number of comments. They achieved the highest performance
on KON FRM and BAY MSP.
Work by [27] focuses on Instagram posts and incorporates platform-specific features re-
trieved from images and its network. They are the first adhere to the literature more closely
and define cyberagression [32] separately from cyberbullying, in that these are single neg-
ative posts rather than the repeated character of cyberbullying. They also show that certain
LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) categories, such as death, appearance, religion,
and sexuality, give a good indication of cyberbullying. While BoW features perform best,
meta-data features (such as user properties and image content) in combination with textual
8Data has been made available at research.cs.wisc.edu/bullying/data.html .
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features from the top 15 comments achieve a similar score. Cyberagression seems to be
slightly easier to classify.
3 Task Evaluation Importance and Hypotheses
The domain of cyberbullying detection is in its early stages, as can be seen in Table 2. Most
datasets are quite small, and only a few have seen repeated experiments. Given the substan-
tial societal importance of improving the methods developed so far, pinpointing shortcom-
ings in the current state of research should assist in creating a robust framework under which
to conduct future experiments—particularly concerning evaluating (domain) generalization
of the classifiers. The latter of which, to our knowledge, none of the current research seems
involved with. This is therefore the main focus of our work. In this section, we define three
motivations for assessing this.
3.1 Data Scarcity
Considering the complexity of the social dynamics underlying the target of classification,
and the costly collection and annotation of training data, the issue of data scarcity can mostly
be explained with respect to the aforementioned restrictions on data access: while on a
small number of platforms most data is accessible without any internal access (commonly
as a result of optional user anonymity), it can be assumed that a signifcant part of actual
bullying takes place ‘behind closed doors’. To uncover this, one would require access to
all known information within a social network (such as friends, connections, and private
messages, including all meta-data). As this is unrealistic in practice, researchers rely on
the small subset of publicly accessible data (predominantly text) streams. Consequently,
most of the datasets used for cyberbullying detection are small and exhibit an extreme skew
between positive and negative messages (as can be seen in Table 3). It is unlikely that
these small sets accurately capture the language-use on a given platform, and generalizable
linguistic features of the bullying instances even less so. We therefore hypothesize that 1)
the samples are underpowered in terms of accurately representing the substantial language
variation between platforms, both in normal language-use and bullying-specific language-
use.
3.2 Task Definition
Furthermore, we argue that this scarcity introduces issues with adherence to the definition of
the task of cyberbullying. The chances of capturing the underlying dynamics of cyberbully-
ing (as defined in the literature) are slim with the message-level (i.e., using single documents
only) approaches that the majority of work in the field has used up until now. The users in
the collected sources have to be rash enough to bully in the open, and particular (curse)
word use that would explain the effectiveness of dictionary and BoW-based approaches in
previous research. Hence, we also hypothesize that 2) the positive instances are biased; only
reflecting a limited dimension of bullying. A more realistic scenario—where characteristics
such as repetitiveness and power imbalance are taken into consideration—would require
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looking at the interaction between persons, or even profile instances rather than single mes-
sages, which, as we argued, is not generally available. The work found in the meta-data
category (Section 2.3) supports this argument with improved results using this information.
This theory regarding the definition (or operationalization) of this task is shared by Rosa
et al., who pose that “the most representative studies on automatic cyberbullying detection,
published from 2011 onward, have conducted isolated online aggression classification” [50,
p. 341]. We will mainly focus on the shared notion that this framing is limited to verbal
aggression; however, our focus will empirically assess its overlap with data framed to solely
contain online toxicity data (i.e., online / cyberagression) to find concrete evidence.
3.3 Domain Influence
Enriching previous work with data such as network structure, interaction statistics, profile
information, and time-based analyses might provide fruitful sources for classification and
a correct operationalization of the task. However, they are also domain-specific, as not all
social media have such a rich interaction structure. Moreover, it is arguably naive to as-
sume that social networks such as Facebook (for which in an ideal case, all aforementioned
information sources are available) will stay a dominant platform of communication. Re-
cently, younger age groups have turned towards more direct forms of communication such
as WhatsApp, Snapchat, or media-focused forms such as Instagram [55]. This move im-
plies more private and less affluent environments in which data can be accessed (resulting in
even more scarcity), and that further development in the field requires a critical evaluation of
the current use of the available features, and ways to improve cross-domain generalization
overall. This work, therefore, does not disregard textual features; they would still need to
be considered as the primary source of information, while paying particular attention to the
issues mentioned here. We further try to contribute towards this goal and hypothesize that
3) crowdsourcing bullying content potentially decreases the influence of domain-specific
language-use, allows for richer representations, and alleviates data scarcity.
4 Data
For the current research, we distinguish a large variety of datasets. For those provided
through the AMiCA (Automatic Monitoring in Cyberspace Applications)10 project, the
Ask.fm corpus is partially available open-source,11 and the Crowdsourced corpus will be
made available upon request. All other sources are publicly available datasets gathered
from previous research12 as discussed in Section 2. Corpus statistics of all data discussed
below can be found in Table 3. The sets’ abbreviations, language (EN for English, NL for
Dutch), and brief collection characteristics can be found below.
9Emojis were detected with https://github.com/NeelShah18/emot . Swears were detected with refer-
ence lists: for English these were taken from www.noswearing.com and the Dutch were manually composed.
10www.amicaproject.be
11https://osf.io/rgqw8/
12These were collected as complete as possible. Twitter, in particular, has low recall; only an approximate of
60% of the tweets were retrieved. Such numbers are expected given the classification problem; people tend to
remove harassing messages as was shown before by [67].
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Table 3: Corpus statistics for English and Dutch cyberbullying datasets, list number of
positive (Pos, bullying) and negative (Neg, other) instances, Types (unique words), Tokens
(total words), average number of tokens per message (Avg Tok/Msg), number of emojis and
emoticons (Emotes), and swear word occurrence (Swears).9
Pos Neg Types Tokens Avg Tok/Msg Emotes Swears
DtwB 236 5,237 11,650 78,649 14 (σ = 8) 959 1,137
D f rm 1,024 11,711 20,818 383,968 30 (σ = 31) 3,308 4,097
Dmsp 426 1,633 13,586 828,583 402 (σ = 291) 932 5,203
Dytb 416 3,022 52,422 826,883 241 (σ = 252) 3,664 1,1277
Dask 4,951 95,159 61,640 1,156,345 12 (σ = 23) 17,801 16,888
DtwX 281 4,703 18,754 87,582 18 (σ = 8) 1,344 450
Dtox 15,292 144,274 223,728 13,319,795 83 (σ = 125) 11,813 36,118
Dask nl 8,055 66,328 67,135 814,970 10 (σ = 14) 15,392 8,296
Dsim nl 2,343 2,546 7,039 62,340 12 (σ = 18) 437 626
Ddon nl 152 211 1,964 7,371 20 (σ = 24) 32 79
4.1 AMiCA
Ask.fm (Dask, Dask nl , EN, NL) were collected from the eponymous social network by
[24]. Ask.fm is a question answering-style network where users interact by (frequently
anonymously) asking questions on other profiles, and answering questions on theirs. As
such, a third party cannot react to these question-answer pairs directly. The anonymity and
restrictive interactions make for a high amount of potential cyberbullying. Profiles were
retrieved through profile seed list, used as a starting point for traversing to other profiles and
collecting all existing question-answer pairs for those profiles—these are predominantly
Dutch and English. Each message was annotated with fine-grained labels (further details
can be found in [64]); however, for the current experiments these were binarized, with any
form of bullying being labeled positive.
Donated (Ddon nl , NL) contains instances of (Dutch) cyberbullying from a mixture of plat-
forms such as Skype, Facebook, and Ask.fm. The set is quite small; however, it contains
several hate pages that are valuable collections of cyberbullying directed towards one per-
son. The data was donated for use in the AMiCA project by previously bullied teens, thus
forming a reliable source of gold standard, real-life data.
Crowdsourced (Dsim nl , NL) originates from a crowdsourcing experiment conducted by
[11], wherein 200 adolescents aged 14 to 18 partook in a role-playing experiment on an
isolated SocialEngine13 social network. Here, each respondent was given the account of
a fictitious person and put in one of four roles in a group of six: a bully, a victim, two
bystander-assistants, and two bystander-defenders. They were asked to read—and identify
with—a character description and respond to an artificially generated initial post attributed
13www.socialengine.com
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to one of the group members. All were confronted with two initial posts containing either
low- or high-perceived severity of cyberbullying.
4.2 Related Work
Formspring (D f rm, EN) is taken from the research by [47] and is composed of posts from
Formspring.me, a question-answering platform similar to Ask.fm. As Formspring is mostly
used by teenagers and young adults, and also provides the option to interact anonymously,
it is notorious for hosting large amounts of bullying content [7]. The data was annotated
through Mechanical Turk, providing a single label by majority vote for a question-answer
pair. For our experiments, the question and answer pairs were merged into one document
instance.
Myspace (Dmsp, EN) was collected by [4]. As this was set up as an information retrieval
task, the posts are labeled in batches of ten posts, and thus a single label applies to the entire
batch (i.e., does it include cyberbullying). These were merged per batch as one instance and
labeled accordingly. Due to this batching, the average tokens per instance are much higher
than any of the other corpora.
Twitter (DtwB, EN) by [9] was collected from the stream between 20-10-2012 and 30-
12-2012, and was labeled based on a majority vote between three annotators. Excluding
re-tweets, the main dataset consists of 220 positive and 5162 negative examples, which
adheres to the general expected occurrence rate of 4%. Their comparably-sized test set,
consisting of 194 positive and 2699 negative examples, was collected by adding a filter to
the stream for messages to contain any of the words school, class, college, and campus.
These sets are merged for the current experiments.
Twitter II (DtwX , EN) from [67] focussed on bullying traces, and was thus retrieved by
keywords (bully, bullying), which if left unmasked generates a strong bias when utilized
for classification purposes (both by word use as well as being a mix of toxicity and victims).
It does, however, allow for demonstrating the ability to detect bullying-associated topics,
and (indirect) reports of bullying.
4.3 Experiment-specific
Ask.fm Context (Cask, Cask nl, EN, NL) — the Ask.fm corpus was collected on profile
level, but prior experiments have focused on single message instances [63]. Here, we ag-
gregate all messages for a single profile, which is then labeled as positive when as few as
a single bullying instance occurs on the profile. This aggregation shifts the task of cyber-
bullying message detection to victim detection on profile level, allowing for more access
to context and profile-level severity (such as repeated harassment), and makes for a more
balanced set (1,763 positive and 6,245 negative instances).
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Figure 2: Jaccard similarity between training
sets (y-axis) and test sets (x-axis).
Figure 3: SVM baseline and NB-
SVM grid values used in hyper-
parameter search.
Part Params Values
BoW range (1,1), (1,2), (1,3)
level words
SVM weight y default, balanced
loss hinge, square hinge
C 1e−3, 1e−2, . . .,
1e2, 1e3
Formspring Context (C f rm, EN) — similar to the Ask.fm corpus, was collected on profile
level [47]. However, the set only includes 49 profiles, some of which only include a single
message. Grouping on full profile level would result in very few instances; thus, we opted
for creating small ‘context’ in batches of five (of the same profile). Similar to the Ask.fm
approach, if one of these messages contains bullying, it is labeled positive, balancing the
dataset (565 positive and 756 negative instances).
Toxicity (Dtox, EN) from Kaggle
14 is a Toxic Comment Classification dataset created by
Conversation AI15 [59] which offers over 300k messages from Wikipedia comments with
Crowdflower-annotated labels for toxicity (including subtypes). Noteworthy is how disjoint
both the task and the platform are from the rest of the corpora used in this research. While
toxicity shares many properties with bullying, the focus here is on single instances of insults
directed to likely unknown people (to the harasser). Given Wikipedia as a source, the article
and moderation focussed comments make it topically quite different from what one would
expect on social media—the fundamental overlap being curse words, which is only one of
many dimensions to be captured to detect cyberbullying (as opposed to toxicity).
4.4 Preprocessing
All texts were tokenized using spaCy [26].16 No preprocessing was conducted for the cor-
pus statistics in Table 3. All models (Section 5) applied lowercasing and special character
removal only; other preprocessing decreased performance (see Table 6).
14https://www.kaggle.com/c/jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge
15https://conversationai.github.io/
16https://spacy.io (v2.0.5)
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4.5 Descriptive Analysis
Both Table 3 and Figure 2 illustrate stark differences; not only across domains but more im-
portantly, between in-domain training and test sets. Most do not exceed a Jaccard similarity
coefficient over 0.20 (Figure 2), implying a large part of their vocabularies do not over-
lap. This contrast is not necessarily problematic for classification; however, it does hamper
learning a general representation for the negative class. It also clearly illustrates how even
more disjoint DtwX (collected by trace queries) and Dtox are from the rest of the corpora and
splits. Finally, the descriptives (Table 3) further show significant differences in size, mes-
sage length, class balance, and type/token ratios (i.e., writing level). In conclusion, it can be
assumed that the language-use in both positive as negative instances will vary significantly,
and that it will be challenging to model in-domain, and generalize out-of-domain.
5 Experimental Setup
We attempt to address the hypotheses posited in Section 3 and propose five main experi-
ments. Experiments I and III deal with the problem of generalizability, whereas Experiment
II and V will both propose a solution for restricted data collection. Experiment IV will
reproduce a selection of the current state-of-the-art models for cyberbullying detection and
subject them to our cross-domain evaluation, to be compared against our baselines.
5.1 Experiment I: Cross-Domain Evaluation
In this experiment, we introduce the cross-domain evaluation framework, which will be ex-
tended in all other experiments. For this, we initially perform a many-to-many evaluation of
a given model (baseline or otherwise) trained individually on all available data sources, split
in train and test. In later experiments, we extend this with a one-to-many evaluation. This
setup implies that (i) we fit our model on some given corpus’ training portion and evaluate
prediction performance on all available corpora their test portions (many-to-many) individ-
ually. Furthermore, we (ii) fit on all corpora their train portions combined, and evaluate
on all their test portions individually (one-to-many). In sum, we report on ‘small’ models
trained on each corpus individually, as well as a ‘large’ one trained on them combined, for
each test set individually.
For every experiment, hyper-parameter tuning was conducted through an exhaustive
grid search, using nested cross-validation (with ten inner and three outer folds) on the train-
ing set to find the optimal combination of the given parameters. Any model selection steps
were based on the evaluation of the outer folds. The best performing model was then refitted
on the full training set (90% of the data) and applied to the test set (10%). All splits (also
during cross-validation) were made in a stratified fashion, keeping the label distributions
across splits similar to the whole set. Henceforth, all experiments in this section can be
assumed to follow this setup.
The many-to-many evaluation framework intends to test Hypothesis 1 (Section 3.1),
relating to language variation and cross-domain performance of cyberbullying detection.
To facilitate this, we employ an initial baselinemodel: Scikit-learn’s [43] Linear Support
Vector Machine (SVM) [15, 22] implementation trained on binary BoW features, tuned
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using the grid shown in Table 3, based on [63]. Given its use in previous research, it should
form a strong candidate against which to compare. To ascertain out-of-domain performance
compared to this baseline, we report test score averages across all test splits, excluding the
set the model was trained on (in-domain).
Consequently, we add an evaluation criterion to that of related work: a model should
both perform overall best in-domain and achieve the highest out-of-domain performance on
average to classify as a robust method. It should be noted that the selected corpora for this
work are not all optimally representative for the task. The tests in our experiments should,
therefore, be seen as an initial proposal to improve the task evaluation.
5.2 Experiment II: Gauging Domain Influence
In an attempt to overcome domain restrictions on language-use, and to further solidify our
tests regarding Hypothesis 1, we aim to improve the performance of our baseline models
through changing our representations in three distinct ways: i) merging all available training
sets (as to simulate a large, diverse corpus), ii) by aggregating instances on user-level, and
iii) using state-of-the-art language representations over simple BoW features in all settings.
We define these experiments as such:
Volume and Variety Some corpora used for training are relatively small, and can thus be
assumed insufficient to represent held-out data (such as the test sets). One could argue that
this can be partially mitigated through simply collecting more data or training on multiple
domains. To simulate such a scenario, we merge all available cyberbullying-related training
splits (creating Dall), which then corresponds to the one-to-many setting of the evaluation
framework. The hope is that corpora similar in size or content (the Twitter sets, Ask.fm
and Formspring, YouTube and Myspace) would benefit from having more (related) data
available. Additionally, training a large model on its entirety facilitates a catch-all setting
for assessing the average cross-domain performance of the full task (i.e. across all test sets
when trained on all available corpora). This particular evaluation will be used in Experiment
IV (replication) for model comparison.
Context Change Practically all corpora, save for MySpace and YouTube, have anno-
tations based on short sentences, which is particularly noticeable in Table 3. This one-
shot (i.e., based on a single message) method of classifying cyberbullying provides min-
imal content (and context) to work with. It does therefore not follow the definition of
cyberbullying—as previously discussed in Section 3.2. As a preliminary simulation17 of
adding (richer) context, we merge the profiles of Dask and (batches of) D f rm into single
context instances (creating Cask and C f rm, see Section 4). This allows us to compare mod-
els trained larger contexts directly to that of single messages, and evaluate how context
restrictions affect performance on the task in general, as well as cross-domain.
Improving Representations Pre-trained word embeddings as language representation
have been demonstrated to yield significant performance gains for a multitude of NLP-
17Preferably, one would want to collect data on profile level by design. The corpora available were not
specifically collected this way, making our set-up an approximation of such a setting.
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related tasks [14]. Given the general lack of training data—including negative instances
for many corpora—word features (and weightings) trained on the available data tend to be
a poor reflection of the language-use on the platform itself, let alone other social media
platforms. Therefore, pre-trained semantic representations provide features that in the-
ory, should perform better in cross-domain settings. We consider two off-the-shelf em-
bedding models per language that are suitable for the task at hand: for English, averaged
200-dimensional GloVe [44] vectors trained on Twitter18, and DistilBERT [51] sentence
embeddings19 [19]. For Dutch, fastText embeddings [8] trained on Wikipedia20 and
word2vec [36, 37] embeddings21 [60] trained on the COrpora from the Web (COW) cor-
pus [52] embeddings. The GLoVe, fastText, and word2vec embeddings were processed
using Gensim22 [46].
As an additional baseline for this section, we include the Naive Bayes Support Vector
Machine (NBSVM) from [65], which should offer competitive performance on text classi-
fication tasks.23 This model also served as a baseline for the Kaggle challenge related to
Dtox.
24 NBSVM uses tf·idf-weighted uni and bi-gram features as input, with a minimum
document frequency of 3, and corpus prevalence of 90%. The idf values are smoothed and
tf scaled sublinearly (1+ log(tf)). These are then weighted by their log-count ratios derived
from Multinomial Naive Bayes.
Tuning of both embeddings and NB representation classifiers is done using the same
grid as Table 3, however replacing C with [1,2,3,4,5,10,25,50,100,200,500]. Lastly, we
opted for Logistic Regression (LR), primarily as this was used in the NBSVM implemen-
tation mentioned above, as well as fastText. Moreover, we found SVM using our grid to
perform marginally worse using these features. The embeddings were not fine-tuned for the
task. While this could potentially increase performance, it complicates direct comparison
to our baselines—we leave this for Experiment IV.
5.3 Experiment III: Aggression Overlap
In previous research using fine-grained labels for cyberbullying classification (e.g., [63]) it
was observed that cyberbullying classifiers achieve the lowest error rates on blatant cases of
aggression (cursing, sexual talk, and threats), an idea that was further adopted by [50]. To
empirically test Hypothesis 2 (see Section 3.2)—related to the bias present in the available
positive instances—we adapt the idea of running a profanity baseline from this previous
work. However, rather than relying on look-up lists containing profane words, we expand
this idea by training a separate classifier on toxicity detection (Dtox) and seeing how well
this performs on our bullying corpora (and vice-versa). For the corpora with fine-grained
labels, we can further inspect and compare the bullying classes captured by this model.
We argue that high test set performance overlap of a toxicity detection model with mod-
18https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/ (v1.2)
19https://github.com/huggingface/transformers (1d646ba)
20https://github.com/facebookresearch/fastText/blob/master/pretrained-vectors.md
(2665eac)
21https://github.com/clips/dutchembeddings (1e3d528)
22https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/index.html (v3.4)
23The implementations for these models can be found in our repository.
24https://kaggle.com/jhoward/nb-svm-strong-linear-baseline/notebook
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els trained on cyberbullying detection gives strong evidence of nuanced aspects of cyber-
bullying not being captured by such models. Notably, in line with [50], that the current
operationalization does not significantly differ from the detection of online aggression (or
toxicity)—and therefore does not capture actual cyberbullying. Given enough evidence,
both issues should be considered as crucial points of improvement for the further develop-
ment of classifiers in this domain.
5.4 Experiment IV: Replicating State-of-the-Art
For this experiment, we include two architectures that achieved state-of-the-art results on
cyberbullying detection. As a reference neural network model for language-based tasks, we
used a Bidirectional [53, 3] Long Short-Term Memory network [25, 23] (BiLSTM), partly
reproducing the architecture from [2]. We then attempt to reproduce the Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) [29] used in both [49] and [2], and the Convolutional LSTM (C-
LSTM) [72] used in [49]. As [49] do not report essential implementation details for these
models (batch size, learning rate, number of epochs), there is no reliable way to reproduce
their work. We will, therefore, take [2] their implementation for the BiLSTM and CNN as
the initial setup. Given that this work is available open-source, we run the exact architecture
(including SMOTE) in our Experiment I and II evaluations. The architecture-specific details
are as follows:
Reproduction We initially adopt the basic implementation25 by [2]: randomly initialized
embeddings with a dimension of 50 (as the paper did not find significant effects of changing
the dimension, nor initialization), run for 10 epochs with a batch size of 128, dropout prob-
ability of 0.25, and a learning rate of 0.01. Further architecture details can be found in our
repository.26 We also run a variant with SMOTE on, and one from the provided notebooks
directly.27 This and following neural models were run on an NVIDIA Titan X Pascal, using
Keras [13] with Tensorflow [1] as backend.
BiLSTM For our own version of the BiLSTM, we minimally changed the architecture
from [2], only tuning using a grid on batch size [32, 64, 128, 256], embedding size [50,
100, 200, 300], and learning rate [0.1, 0.01, 0.05, 0.001, 0.005]. Rather than running for
ten epochs, we use a validation split (10% of the train set) and initiate early stopping when
the validation loss does not go down after three epochs. Hence—and in contrast to earlier
experiments—we do not run the neural models in 10-fold cross-validation, but a straight-
forward 2-fold train and test split where the latter is 10% of a given corpus. Again, we are
predominantly interested in confirming statements made in earlier work; namely, that for
this particular setting tuning of the parameters does not meaningfully affect performance.
CNN We use the same experimental setup as for the BiLSTM. The implementations of
[2, 49] use filter window sizes of 3, 4, and 5—max pooled at the end. Given that the same
25https://github.com/sweta20/Detecting-Cyberbullying-Across-SMPs/blob/master/DNNs.ipynb
26https://github.com/cmry/amica/blob/master/neural.py
27Note this is for testing reproduction only, as it is not subjected to the same evaluation framework.
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grid is used, the word embedding sizes are varied and weights trained (whereas [49] use 300-
dimensional pre-trained embeddings). Therefore, for direct performance comparisons, [2]
their results will be used as a reference. As CNN-based architectures for text classification
are often also trained on character level, we include a model variant with this input as well.
C-LSTM For this architecture, we take an open-source text classification survey imple-
mentation.28 This uses filter windows of [10, 20, 30, 40, 50], 64-dimensional LSTM cells
and a final 128 dimensional dense layer. Please refer to our repository for additional imple-
mentation details—for this and previous architectures.
5.5 Experiment V: Crowdsourced Data
Following up on the proposed shortcomings of the currently available corpora in Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2, we propose the use of a crowdsourcing approach to data collection. In this
experiment, we will repeat Experiment I and II with the best out-of-domain classifier from
the above evaluations with three (Dutch29) datasets: Dask nl; the Dutch part of the Ask.fm
dataset used before, Dsim nl; our synthetic, crowdsourced cyberbullying data, and lastly
Ddon nl; a small donated cyberbullying test set with messages from various platforms (full
overview and description of these three can be found in Section 4). The only notable differ-
ence to our setup for this experiment is that we never use Ddon nl as training data. Therefore
rather than Dall , the Ask.fm corpus is merged with the crowdsourced cyberbullying data to
make up the Dcomb set.
6 Results and Discussion
We will now cover results per experiment, and to what extent these provide support for
the hypotheses posed in Section 3. As most of these required backward evaluation (e.g.,
Experiment III was tested on sets from Experiment I), the results of Experiment I-III are
compressed in Table 4. Table 6 comprises the Improving Representations part of Experiment
II (under ‘word2vec’ and ‘DistilBERT’) along with the preprocessing results effect of our
baselines. The results of Experiment V can be found in Table 7. For brevity of reporting,
the latter two only report on the in-domain scores, and feature the out-of-domain averages
for the Dall models for comparison, and Dtox averages in Table 7.
6.1 Experiment I
Looking at Table 4, the upper group of rows under T1 represents the results for Experiment
I. We posed in Hypothesis 1 that samples are underpowered regarding their representation of
the language variation between platforms, both for bullying and normal language-use. The
data analysis in Section 4.5 showed minimal overlap between domains in vocabulary and
notable variances in numerous aspects of the available corpora. Consequently, we raised
28https://github.com/bicepjai/Deep-Survey-Text-Classification/
29On account of the synthetic data being available in Dutch only. Experiment III was not repeated as there is
no equivalent toxicity dataset available in this language.
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Table 4: Cross-corpora positive class F1 scores for Experiment I (T1), II (T2), and III (T3).
Models are fitted on the training proportion of the corpora row-wise, and tested column-
wise. The out-of-domain average (Avg) excludes test performance of the parent training
corpus. The best overall test score is noted in bold, the best out-of-domain performance in
gray.
Train T1 Avg T2 T3
DtwB D f rm Dmsp Dytb Dask DtwX C f rm Cask Dtox
DtwB .417 .308 .000 .122 .298 .051 .153 .131 .158 .349
D f rm .423 .454 .042 .379 .418 .041 .321 .682 .259 .465
Dmsp .120 .176 .941 .324 .168 .043 .197 .364 .185 .185
Dytb .074 .160 .375 .365 .138 .000 .183 .338 .197 .140
Dask .493 .444 .211 .421 .561 .139 .351 .389 .357 .584
DtwX .049 .131 .184 .175 .077 .508 .205 .496 .325 .082
Dall .524 .473 .941 .397 .553 .194 .557 .780 .570 .587
C f rm .152 .253 .143 .286 .136 .126 .214 .758 .400 .372
Cask .286 .237 .359 .244 .356 .107 .310 .582 .579 .280
Dtox .343 .373 .449 .335 .443 .149 .389 .628 .539 .806
doubts regarding the ability of models trained on these individual corpora to generalize to
other corpora (i.e., domains).
Firstly, we consider how well our baseline performed on the in-domain test sets. For
half of the corpora, it performs best overall on these specific sets (i.e., the test set portion of
the data the model was trained on). More importantly, this entails that for four of the other
sets, models trained on other corpora perform equal or better. Particularly the effectiveness
of Dask was in some cases surprising; the YouTube corpus by [17] (Dytb), for example,
contains much longer instances (see Table 2).
It must be noted though, that the baseline was selected from work on the Ask.fm cor-
pus [63]. This data is also one of the more diverse datasets (and largest) with exclusively
short messages; therefore, one could assume a model trained on this data would work well
on both longer and shorter instances. It is however also likely that particularly this base-
line (binary word features) trained on this data therefore enforces the importance of more
shallow features. This we will be further explored in Experiments II and III.
For Experiment I, however, our goal was to assess the out-of-domain performance of
these classifiers, not to maximize performance. For this, we turn to the Avg column in
Table 4. Between the top portion of the Table, the Dask model performs best across all
domains (achieving highest on three, as mentioned above). The second-best model is trained
on the Formspring data from [47] (D f rm), akin to Ask.fm as a domain (question-answer
style, option to post anonymously). It can be observed that almost all models perform
worst on the ‘bullying traces’ Twitter corpus by [67], which was collected using queries.
This result is relatively unsurprising, given the small vocabulary overlaps with its test set
shown in Figure 2. We also confirm in line with [47] that the CAW data from [4] is unfit
as a bullying corpus; achieving significant positive F1-scores with a baseline, generalizing
poorly and proving difficult as a test set.
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Figure 4: Left: Top 20 test set words with the highest average coefficient values across all
classifiers (minus the model trained on Dtox). Error bars represent standard deviation. Each
coefficient value is only counted once per test set. The frequency of the words is listed in
the annotation. Right: Test set occurrence frequencies (and percentages) of the top 5,000
highest absolute feature coefficient values.
Additionally, we observe that even the best performing models yield between .1 and .2
lower F1 scores on other domains, or a 15− 30% drop from the original score. To explain
this, we look at how well important features generalize across test sets. As our baseline
is a Linear SVM, we can directly extract all grams with positive coefficients (i.e., related to
bullying). Figure 4 (right) shows the frequency of the top 5,000 features with the highest
coefficient values. These can be observed to follow a Zipfian-like distribution, where the im-
portant features most frequently occur in one test set (25.5%) only, which quickly drops off
with increasing frequency. Conversely, this implies that over 75% of the top 5,000 features
seen during training do not occur in any test instance, and only 3% generalize across all sets.
This coverage decreases to roughly 60% and 4% respectively for the top 10,000, providing
further evidence of the strong variation in predominantly bullying-specific language-use.
Figure 4 (left) also indicates that the coefficient values are highly unstable across test
sets, with most having roughly a 0.4 standard deviation. Note that these coefficient values
can also flip to negative for particular sets, so for some of the features, the range goes
from associated with the other class to highly associated with bullying. Given the results of
Table 4 and Figure 4, we can conclude that our baseline model shows not to generalize
out-of-domain. Given the quantitative and qualitative results reported on in this Experiment,
this particular setting partly supports Hypothesis 1.
6.2 Experiment II
The results for this experiment can be predominantly found in Table 4 (middle and lower
parts, and T2 in particular), and partly in Table 6 (word2vec, DistilBERT). In this exper-
iment, we seek to further test Hypothesis 1 by employing three methods: merging all cy-
berbullying data to increase volume and variety, aggregating on context level for a context
change, and improving representations through pre-trained word embedding features. These
are all reasonably straightforward methods that can be employed in an attempt to mitigate
data scarcity.
Volume and Variety The results for this part are listed under Dall in Table 4. For all of
the following experiments, we now focus on the full results table (including that of Experi-
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Table 5: Examples of uni-gram weights according to the baseline SVM trained Dall ,
tested on DtwB and Dask. Words in red are associated with bullying, words in green with
neutral content. The color intensity is derived from the strength of the SVM coefficients per
feature (most are near zero). Black boxes indicate OOV words. Labels are divided between
the gold standard (y) and predicted (yˆ) labels, , for bullying content, - for neutral.
y yˆ DtwB Dask
- , about to leave this school
library and take my *ss
homeeee
bigerrr ? how much ? its
gon na touch the sky ? a
wonder d*ck ?
, , you p*ss me off so much . r u a r*t*rd liam mate
f*ck off
, - @username i will skull drag
you across campus .
h* of me xoxoxoxoxoxoox
ment I) and see which individual classifiers generalize best across all test sets (highlighted
in gray). The Avg column shows that our ‘big’ model trained on all available corpora30
achieves second-best performance on half of the test sets and best on the other half. More
importantly, it has the highest average out-of-domain performance, without competition on
any test set. These observations imply that for the baseline setting, an ensemble model
of different smaller classifiers should not be preferred over the big model. Consequently, it
can be concluded that collecting more data does seem to aid the task as a whole.
However, a qualitative analysis of the predictions made by this model clearly shows
lingering limitations (see Table 5). These three randomly-picked examples give a clear
indication of the focus on blatant profanity (such as d*ck, p*ss, and f*ck). Especially
combinations of words that in isolation might be associated with bullying content (leave,
touch) tend to confuse the model. It also fails to capture more subtle threats (skull drag)
and infrequent variations (h*). Both of these structural mistakes could be mitigated by
providing more context that potentially includes either more toxicity or more examples of
neutral content to decrease the impact of single curse words—hence, the next experiment.
Context Change As for access to context scopes, we are restricted to the Ask.fm and
Formspring data (C f rm andCask in Table 4). Nevertheless, in both cases, we see a noticeable
increase for in-domain performance: a positive F1 score of .579 for context scope versus
.561 on Ask.fm, and .758 versus .454 on Formspring respectively. This increase implies
that considering message-level detection for both individual sets should be preferred. On
the other hand, however, these longer contexts do perform worse on out-of-domain sets.
On manual inspection of the feature differences between the other sets, Dask and D f rm
individually, and C f rm and Cask, the scope shift clearly shows in their importances. From
a sample of 500 top features occurring in the test set, 63% are profane words. For the
30This average excludes toxicity data from Dtox, which we found when added to substantially decrease per-
formance on all domains, except for DtwX and C f rm. Note that it also includes scopes from the context change
experiment.
Emmery et al. 21
Table 6: Overview of different feature representations (Repr) for Experiment I and II. The
‘+’ parts show performance for preprocessing: removing all special characters (clean), and
more sophisticated handling of social media tags and emojis (preproc). Their in-domain
positive class F1 scores for Experiment I (T1) and II (T2), and the out-of-domain average
(Avg) for Dall . Baseline scores are from Table 4.
Repr T1 Avg T2 T3
DtwB D f rm Dmsp Dytb Dask DtwX C f rm Cask Dtox
baseline .417 .454 .941 .365 .561 .508 .557 .758 .579 .806
+ clean .408 .477 .927 .354 .562 .517 .561 .764 .592 .807
+ preproc .345 .426 .929 .377 .506 .293 .512 .600 .582 .734
NBSVM .364 .462 .929 .231 .508 .469 .542 .635 .592 .779
+ clean .410 .456 .940 .211 .541 .467 .563 .641 .596 .747
+ preproc .318 .466 .907 .320 .480 .305 .566 .532 .597 .756
word2vec .368 .394 .860 .338 .304 .323 .366 .698 .572 .634
DistilBERT .377 .336 .697 .296 .369 .435 .402 .598 .629 .642
models trained on Ask.fm and Formspring this is an average of 42%, and models trained on
both context scopes, it is significantly reduced to 11%. Many important bi-gram features
include you, topics such as dating, boys, girls, and girlfriend occur, yet also positive
words such as (are) beautiful—the latter of which could indicate messages from friends
(defenders). This change is to an extent expected as by changing the scope, the task shifts
to classifying profiles that are bullied, thus showing more diverse bullying characteristics.
These results provide evidence for extending classification to contexts to be a worth-
while platform-specific setting to pursue. However, we can conversely draw the same con-
clusions as Experiment I; that including direct context does not overcome the tasks general
domain limitations, therefore further supporting Hypothesis 1. A plausible solution to this
could be improving upon the BoW features by relying on more general representations of
language, as found in word embeddings.
Improving Representations The aim for this experiment was to find (out-of-the-box)
representations that would improve upon the simple BoW features used in our baseline
model (i.e., achieving good in-domain performance as well as out-of-domain generaliza-
tion). Table 6 lists both of our considered baselines, tested under different preprocessing
methods. These are then compared against the two different embedding representations.
For preprocessing, several levels were used: the default for all models being 1) low-
ercasing only, then either 2) removal of special characters, or 3) lemmatization and more
appropriate handling of special characters (e.g., splitting #word to prepend a hashtag token)
were added. The corresponding results in Table 6 do not reveal an unequivocal preprocess-
ing method for either the BoW baseline or NBSVM. While the latter achieves highest
out-of-domain generalization with thorough preprocessing (‘+preproc’, .566 positive F1),
the baseline model achieves best in-domain performance on five out of nine corpora, and
an on-par out-of-domain average (.566 versus .561) with simple cleaning (‘+clean’).
According to our criterion proposed in Section 5.1, the method with good in- and out-of-
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domain should be preferred. The current consideration of preprocessing methods illustrates
how this stricter evaluation criterion used in this experiment potentially yields different
overall results in contrast to evaluating in-domain only, or focusing on single corpora. Con-
versely, we opted for simple cleaning throughout the rest of our experiment (as mentioned
in Section 4.4), given its consistent performance for both baselines.
The embeddings do not seem to provide representations that yield and overall improve-
ment for the classification performance of our Logistic Regression model. Surprisingly,
however, DistilBERT does yield significant gains over our baseline for the conversation-
level corpus of Ask.fm (.629 positive F1 over .579). This might imply that such represen-
tations would work well on more (balanced) data, although fine-tuning would be a require-
ment for drawing strong conclusions. Moreover, given that we restricted our embeddings to
averaged representations on document-level for word2vec, and the sentence representation
token for BERT, other settings remain unexplored; however, are not in scope of the current
work. Therefore, we can conclude that no other alternative (out-of-the-box) baselines seem
to clearly outperform our BoW baseline. We previously eluded to its effectiveness in previ-
ous work, and argued this being a result of capturing blatant profanity. We will further test
this in the next experiment.
6.3 Experiment III
Here, we investigate Hypothesis 2: the notion that positive instances across all cyberbully-
ing corpora are biased, and only reflect a limited dimension of bullying. We have already
found strong evidence for this in the previous Experiments I and II, Figure 4, Table 5, and
manual analyses of top features all indicated toxicity to be consistent top-ranking features.
To add more empirical evidence to this, we trained models on toxicity, or cyber aggression,
and tested them on bullying data (and vice-versa)—providing results on the overlap between
the tasks. The results for this experiment can be found in the lower end of Table 4, under
Dtox and T3.
It can be noted that there is a substantial gap in performance between the cyberbullying
classifiers (using Dall as reference) performance on the Dtox test set and that of the toxicity
model (positive F1 score of .587 and .806 respectively). More strikingly, however, the other
way around, toxicity classifiers perform second-best on the out-of-domain averages (Avg
in Table 4). In the context scopes (C f rm and Cask) it is notably close, and for other sets
relatively close, to the in-domain performance.
Cyberbullying detection should include detection of toxic content, yet also perform on
more complex social phenomena, likely not found in the Wikipedia comments of the toxic-
ity corpus. It is therefore particularly surprising that it achieves higher out-of-domain per-
formance on cyberbullying classification than all individual models using BoW features to
capture bullying content. Only when all corpora are combined, the Dall classifier performs
better than the toxicity model. This observation combined with previous results provides
significant evidence that a large part of the available cyberbullying content is not complex,
and current models to only generalize to a limited extent using predominately simple ag-
gressive features, supporting Hypothesis 3.
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Table 7: Overview of different architectures (Arch) their in-domain positive class F1 scores
for Experiment I (T1) and II (T2), the out-of-domain average for Dall (all), and Dtox (tox).
Baseline model (and scores) is that of Table 4. Reproduction results of [2] are denoted by *,
their oversampling method by +. Our tuned model versions have no annotation, character
level models are denoted by ⋆.
Arch T1 Avg T2 T3
DtwB D f rm Dmsp Dytb Dask DtwX all tox C f rm Cask Dtox
baseline .417 .454 .941 .365 .561 .508 .557 .389 .758 .579 .806
NBSVM .383 .486 .925 .387 .476 .396 .551 .385 .703 .604 .797
BiLSTM* .171 .363 .938 .152 .504 .400 .440 .349 .609 .507 .762
BiLSTM+ .188 .396 .951 .160 .438 .341 .417 .337 .541 .505 .737
BiLSTM .182 .341 .905 .148 .463 .246 .479 .356 .608 .522 .774
CNN* .500 .276 .790 .133 .462 .438 .364 .350 .000 .306 .753
CNN .444 .416 .816 .000 .498 .438 .464 .342 .000 .610 .754
CNN⋆ .444 .419 .816 .000 .499 .375 .460 .362 .000 .647 .774
C-LSTM* .000 .421 .875 .095 .000 .000 .449 .329 .094 .425 .757
C-LSTM .000 .019 .829 .000 .066 .000 .463 .355 .095 .518 .761
C-LSTM⋆ .000 .057 .853 .075 .008 .000 .278 .358 .296 .506 .756
6.4 Experiment IV
So far, we have attempted to improve a straight-forward baseline that was trained on binary
features with several different approaches. While changes in data (representations) seem to
have a noticeable effect on performance (increasing the amount of messages per instance,
merging all corpora), none of the experiments with different feature representations have
had an impact. With the current experiment, we had hoped to leverage earlier state-of-the-art
architectures by reproducing their methodology and subjecting our evaluation framework.
As can be inferred from Table 7, our baselines outperform these neural techniques on
almost all in-domain tests, as well as the out-of-domain averages. Having strictly upheld
the experimental set-up from [2] and as close as possible that of [49], we can conclude
that—under stricter evaluation—there is sufficient evidence that these models do not pro-
vide state-of-the-art results on the task of cyberbullying.31 Tuning these networks (at least
in our set-up) does not seem to improve performance, rather decrease it. This indicates that
the validation set on which early stopping is conducted is often not representative to the
test set. Parameter tuning on this set is consequently sensitive to overfitting; an arguably
unsurprising result given the size of the corpora.
31Upon acquiring the results of the replication of [2] (in particular failing to replicate the effect of the paper’s
oversampling) we investigated the provided code and notebooks. It is our understanding that oversampling
before splitting the dataset into training and test sets causes the increase in performance; we measured overlap
of positive instances in these splits and found no unique test instances. Furthermore, after re-running the
experiments directly from the notebooks with the oversampling conducted post-split, the effect was significantly
decreased (similar to our results in Table 7). The authors were contacted with our observations in March 2019.
They unfortunately have not yet confirmed our results. Their repository remains unchanged as of October 2019.
Our analyses can be found here: https://github.com/cmry/amica/tree/master/reproduction .
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Table 8: Positive class F1 scores for Experiment IV on Dutch data. Models are fitted on the
training proportion of the corpora row-wise and tested column-wise. The best overall test
score is noted in bold. The scores of primary interest are highlighted in gray.
train T1 T2
Dask nl Dsim nl Ddon nl DaskC nl DsimC nl
Dask nl .598 .516 .495 .264 .533
Dsim nl .273 .708 .667 .501 .800
Dcomb .608 .681 .516 .801 .808
DaskC nl .165 .361 .182 .505 .750
DsimC nl .175 .424 .333 .496 .750
Dall nl .577 .677 .516 .379 .821
Some further noteworthy observations can be made related to the performance of the
CNN architecture, achieving quite significant leaps on word level (for DtwB) and character
level (for Cask). Particularly the conversation scopes (C, with a comparitatively balanced
class distribution) see much more competitive perfomance compared to the baselines. The
same effect can be observed when more data is available; both averages test scores for Dall
and Dtox are comparable to the baseline across almost all architectures. Additionally, the
Dtox scores indicate that all architectures show about the same overlap on toxicity detection,
although interestingly, less so for the neural models than for the baselines.
It can therefore be concluded that the current neural architectures do not provide a so-
lution to the limitations of the task, rather, suffering more in performance. Our experiments
do, however, once more illustrate that the proposed techniques of improving the represen-
tations of the corpora (by providing more data through merging all sources, and balancing
by classifying batches of multiple messages, or conversations) allow the neural models to
approach the baseline ballpark. As our goal here was not to completely optimize these ar-
chitectures, but replication, the proposed techniques still could provide more avenues for
further research. Finally, given its robust performance, we will continue to use the baseline
model for the next eperiment.
6.5 Experiment V
Due to the nature of its experimental set-up (which generates balanced data with simple
language-use, as shown in Table 2), the crowdsourced data proves easy to classify. There-
fore, we do not report out-of-domain averages, as this set would skew them too optimisti-
cally, and be uninformative. Regardless, we are primarily interested in performance when
crowdsourced data is added, or used as a replacement for real data. In contrast to the other
experiments, the focus will mostly be on the Ask.fm (Dask nl) and donated (Ddon nl) scores
(see Table 8). The scores on the Dutch part of the Ask.fm corpus are quite similar to those
on the English corpus (.561 vs .598 positive F1 score), which is line with earlier results [63].
Moreover, particularly for the small amount of data, the crowdsourced corpus performs sur-
prisingly well on Dask nl (.516), and significantly better on the donated test data (.667 on
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Ddon nl).
In the settings that utilize context representations, training on conversation scopes ini-
tially does not seem to improve detection performance in any of the configurations (save
for a marginal gain on DsimC nl). However, it does simplify the task in a meaningful way
at test-time; whereas a slight gain is obtained for message-level Dask nl (from .598 F1-score
to .608), when merging both datasets a significant performance boost can be found when
training on Dcomb and testing on DaskC nl (from .264 and .501 to .801 on the combined).
Hence, it can be concluded that enriching the existing training set with crowdsourced data
yields promising improvements.
Based on these results, we confirm the Experiment II results hold for Dutch: more
diverse, larger datasets, and increasing context sizes contributes to better performance on
the task. Most importantly, there is enough evidence to support Hypothesis 3: the data
generated by the crowdsourcing experiment helps detection rates for our in-the-wild test set,
and its combination with externally collected data increases performance with and without
additional context.
6.6 Suggestions for Future Work
We hope our experiments have helped shed light, and will raise further attention regarding
multiple issues with methodological rigor pertaining the task of cyberbullying detection. It
is our understanding that the disproportionate amount of work on the (oversimplified) classi-
fication task, versus the lack of focus on constructing rich, representative corpora reflecting
the actual dynamics of bullying, has made critical assessment of the advances in this task
difficult. We would therefore want to particularly stress the importance of simple baselines
and the out-of-domain tests that we included in the evaluation criterion for this research.
They would provide a fairer comparison for proposed novel classifiers, and a more unified
method of evaluation.
Furthermore, novel research would benefit from explicitly finding evidence to support
its assumptions that classifiers labeled ‘cyberbullying detection’ do more than one-shot,
message-level toxicity detection. We would argue that the current framing of the majority
of work on the task is still too limited to be considered theoretically-defined cyberbullying
classification. In our research, we demonstrated several qualitative and quantitative methods
that can facilitate such analyses. As popularity of the application of cyberbullying detection
is increasing, this would avoid misrepresenting the conducted work, and that of possible
in-the-wild applications in the future.
While we demonstrated a method of collecting plausible cyberbullying with guaranteed
consent, the more valuable sources of real-life bullying that allow for complex models of
social interaction remain restricted. It is our expectation that future modeling will benefit
from the construction of much larger (anonymized) corpora—as most fields dealing with
language have, and we therefore hope to see future work heading this direction.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we identified several issues that affect the majority of the current research on
cyberbullying detection. As it is difficult to collect accurate cyberbullying data in the wild,
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the field suffers from data scarcity. In an optimal scenario, rich representations capturing all
required meta-data to model the complex social dynamics of what the literature defines as
cyberbullying would likely prove fruitful. However, one can assume such access to remain
restricted for the time being, and with current social media moving towards private com-
munication, to not be generalizable in the first place. Thus, significant changes need to be
made to the empirical practices in this field. To this end, we provided a cross-domain eval-
uation setup and tested several cyberbullying detection models, under a range of different
representations to potentially overcome the limitations of the available data, and provide a
fair, rigorous framework to facilitate direct model comparison for this task.
Additionally, we formed three hypotheses we would expect to find evidence for during
these evaluations: 1) the corpora are too small and heterogeneous to represent the strong
variation in language-use for both bullying and neutral content across platforms accurately,
2) the positive instances are biased, predominantly capturing toxicity, and no other dimen-
sions of bullying, and finally 3) crowdsourcing poses a resource to generate plausible cy-
berbullying events, and that can help expand the available data and improve the current
models.
We found evidence for all three hypotheses: previous cyberbullying models generalize
poorly across domains, simple BoW baselines prove difficult to improve upon, there is con-
siderable overlap between toxicity classification and cyberbullying detection, and crowd-
sourced data yields well-performing cyberbullying detection models. We believe that the
results of Hypotheses 1) and 2 in particular are principal hurdles that need to be tackled to
advance this field of research. Furthermore, we showed that both leveraging training data
from all openly available corpora, and shifting representations to include context mean-
ingfully improves performance on the overall task. Therefore, we believe both should be
considered as an evaluation point in future work. More so given that we show that these
do not solve the existing limitations of the currently available corpora, and could therefore
provide avenues for future research focusing on collecting (richer) data. Lastly, we show
reproducibility of models that previously demonstrated state-of-the-art performance on this
task to fail. We hope that the observations and contributions made in this paper can aid to
improve rigor in future cyberbullying detection work.
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